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Corporate law is based on the premise that directors are fiduciaries of their companies. This is 
an unbending duty which has to be adhered to at all cost by individuals appointed as directors 
of a company. Previously the director’s duties were governed by the common law which 
often relied on the interpretation of the courts on a case by case basis. Therefore the courts 
would often arrive at different conclusions based on a similar set of facts. The advent of the 
2008 Companies Act (Act 71 of 2008)1 brought about a major evolution in South African 
company law by partially codifying the fiduciary duties of the directors.  Understanding 
fiduciary duties of a director is of significant importance in the modern democracy based on 
the fact that directors engage on the international spectrum. Company directors have 
discretionary power which may be abused if they are not familiar with the fiduciary duties.  
This study seeks to comprehend fully the fiduciary duties of a director of a company. These 
are the duty to act bona fide, the duty to act for a p oper purpose, the duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest and the duty not to use a corporate opportunity and information for personal profit. 
This task will be undertaken both in terms of the common law as well as statute (Companies 
Act 2008 Act). The study will delineate the fundamental consequences of partial codification 
of these duties and set out the current legal position of the common law which operates in 
tandem with the statute. In addition, it will deal with whether the common law provisions are 
still applicable side by side with the statutes.    
The duties of a company director represent a subject that is not merely academic in nature, 
but one that is of vital importance in our ever changing commercial world. More and more 
people are appointed as company directors every day and often they do not know or 
understand the implications of what they have agreed to.  
  
                                                          





Section 66(1) of the 2008 Companies Act2 states that the business and affairs of the company 
must be managed by or under the direction of its board f directors, which has the authority 
to exercise all the powers and perform any of the functions of the company, except to the 
extent that the Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise. A 
company is a juristic person and it functions through human agency. It acts through its 
members in general meetings, and through its directo s and employees.3 The day to day 
running of a company is the responsibility of the board of directors. This chapter will 
examine the meaning of the word ‘fiduciary’ and when a fiduciary relationship comes into 
existence. It will also examine the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship, the meaning of 
the term ‘director’, and to whom the fiduciary duties are owed.  
 
1.2 Who is a director? 
At times, the word ‘directors’ had caused confusion as it is generally used not only to indicate 
the plural of an individual director but also the board of directors as a whole.4 The directors, 
individually and as a board, are often referred to in company law sources as the trustee.5 As 
the director and the board of directors can in no way be regarded as owners of the company 
assets, their description as “trustee” is wholly inappropriate in South African law.6 The term 
‘director’ has been defined in law. The 2008 Companies Act defines a director as:  
“A member of the board of a company, as contemplated in section 66, or an alternate 
director of a company and includes any person occupying the position of a director or 
alternate director, by whatever name designated.7”  
 
                                                          
2 Act 71 of 2008; s66. 
3 FHI Cassim Contemporary Company Law (2012) 411. 
4 HS Cilliers Corporate Law. (1992) 112. 
5 Cilliers (see note 4; 112). 
6 Cilliers (see note 4; 112). 
7 Act 71 of 2008; s66. 
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The Act defines “board” as meaning the board of directors of a company.8 Thus “board” or 
“board of directors” means the directors of the company acting collectively.9 Where the board 
acts within the scope of their powers, its acts are the acts of the company itself and not 
merely the acts of an agent or representative. The precise nature of the legal relationship 
between the company and a director is still a controversial question and several views have 
been expressed on this issue.10 Inter alia, directors have been described as agents of the 
company, and as managing partners.11 Previously, a director did not enjoy original powers to 
act and, like an agent, his or her power to act arose from, and was limited by, the powers 
conferred on him or her. For instance, a director, like an agent, acts for the benefit of some 
other person, that is, the company, and not for his or her own benefit. When they contract on 
behalf of the company, they do not incur liability, unless they act outside their powers, or 
expressly or impliedly assume liability.12 But s 66(1) of the Act now confers original powers 
and duties on directors.13 
The primary function of the board of directors is to take top-level decisions regarding the 
management and strategy of the company.14 The board of directors is often called upon to 
take business risks and chances in the endeavor to earn profits for the company.15 These 
decisions are then executed by the company’s managers nd employees.16 The King III 
Report confirms that it is for the board of directors to act as the focal point and custodian of 
corporate governance.17 The court in South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu18 
stressed that good corporate governance (particularly in state-owned enterprises) is ultimately 
about effective leadership. The court further held that an organization depends on its board of 
directors to provide it with direction.19 The board should ensure that the company is and is 
seen to be, a responsible corporate citizen and should provide effective leadership based on 
an ethical foundation.20 The board of directors is responsible for the strategic and control of 
                                                          
8 Act 71 of 2008; s1. 
9 Act 71 of 2008; s1. 
10 Cassim (see note 3; 412). 
11 Cassim (see note 3; 412). 
12 Act 71 of 2008; s66 (1). 
13 Cassim (see note 3; 412). 
14 Cassim (see note 3; 412). 
15 RL Beuthin. Beuthin’s Basic Company Law 3ed (2000) 218. 
16 Beuthin (see note 15; 218). 
17 Cassim (see note 3; 480). 
18 (2009) 4 All SA 169 (GSJ) para 60. 
19 South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu 2009 (4) All SA 169 (GSJ). 
20 South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu supra. 
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the company. It should strive to achieve the appropriate balance between its various 
stakeholder groupings, and is urged to take into acc unt, as far as possible, the legitimate 
interests and expectations of its stakeholders when making decisions in the best interests of 
the company.21 Therefore, both the directors individually and theboard stand quite clearly in 
a fiduciary relationship towards the company in everything that they do. When a director acts 
in his capacity as a director he must do so in good faith and for the benefit of the company as 
a whole.22 In other words, a director has an affirmative duty to safeguard and protect the 
affairs of the company.23 
Ryan indicated that a director is not an employee of the company and that he or she is not 
under a duty to carry out the instructions of another person.24 A director’s duty obliges him to 
exercise an independent judgment on what is in the best interests of the company and to act 
accordingly. He or she holds the position not in terms of a contract of employment with the 
company but by virtue of having been elected by the shareholders meeting.25 As a result, 
unless he or she has a service contract with the company, the position carries no security of 
tenure and the shareholder’s meeting can pass a resolution to oust him or her from office at 
any time.26 However, there is no restriction under the Act, that a director cannot be an 
employee of the company. In Lee v Lee’s Air Farming27, it was held that a director may 
however work as an employee in a different capacity. A director who has entered into a 
service contract with the company will, in his capacity as an employee, be subjected to 
contractual duties involving the carrying out of instructions, but when such a person is acting 
qua director, he is required to bring an independent judgment on what is in the best interests 
of the company, and to act accordingly.28 
If the powers referred to above have been vested in the directors, they alone may exercise 
them, and the shareholders will have no power to interfere or control them in the exercise of 
that power, or to perform any of the functions entrusted to the directors, provided that they 
are in fact acting within the scope of the powers which have been conferred upon.29 In the 
                                                          
21 Principle 8.3 of the King III Report. 
22 Beuthin (see note 15; 218). 
23 Howard v Herrigel supra at 45. 
24 C Ryan Company Directors: Liabilities, Rights and Duties. (1987) 8.  
25 Beuthin (see note 15; 205). 
26 Cassim (see note 3; 426). 
27 1961 AC 12. 
28 Cassim (see note 3; 426). 
29 Beuthin (see note 15; 218). 
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same way the directors have no power to interfere with the shareholders in the exercise by 
them of such powers as may have been vested in the company in general meeting.30 
A question maybe asked whether a de facto director falls within the definition of director. A
De facto director is: 
 “A person who assumes to act as a director. He is held out as a director of the 
company, and claims and purports to be a director, although never actually or validly 
appointed as such. To establish that a person was a de f cto director of a company it 
is necessary to plead and prove that he undertook functions in relation to the 
company which could properly be discharged only by a director. It is not sufficient to 
show that he was concerned in the management of the company’s affairs or undertook 
tasks in relation to its business which can properly be performed by a manager below 
board level.”31 
 The words ‘occupying the position of a director’ in the definition of a director in s 1 makes it 
clear that a de facto director constitutes a director for the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, a 
director may not escape his or her duties by virtue that he or she has not been formally or 
validly appointed as a director. A de facto director is subject to the fiduciary duties and other 
duties of a director.32 
The court in Gemma Ltd v Davies33 held that it is necessary for the person alleged to be a de 
facto director to have participated in directing the affairs of the company on an equal footing 
with the other directors and not in a subordinate rol . Cassim submits that a de facto director 
and a shadow director are often confused and must be distinguished from each other.34 A de 
facto director acts openly as if he is a director of the company whilst a ‘shadow director’ is a 
third party who secretly exerts influence on the board of directors in breach of their fiduciary 
duties.35 Cassim further submits that in English law a ‘shadow irector’ is a person in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are 
accustomed to act.36 As the name implies a shadow director lurks in the s adow, sheltering 
                                                          
30 Beuthin (see note 15; 219). 
31 Holland v Revenue & Customs (2010) UKSC 51, para 20. 
32 Cassim (see note 3; 409). 
33 (2008) BCC para 40. 
34 Cassim (see note 3; 409). 
35 L Coetzee and J van Tonder ‘The Fiduciary Relationship between a company and its directors’ (2014) 35 
Obiter 300.  
36 Cassim (see note 3; 409). 
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behind others who he or she claims are the only directo s of the company to the exclusion of 
him or her.37 He is not held out as a director by the company, but exercises power from the 
shadows.38 The court in Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd39 stated that the concepts of a de facto and 
a shadow director do not overlap but are alternatives, and in most cases are mutually 
exclusive.40 This is owed from the fact that a de facto director is one who claims to act and 
purports to act as a director, although not validly appointed. A shadow director does not 
claim or purport to act as a director, but in fact claims not to be a director.41 In Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry v Deverell42 the court held that a shadow director acts as a 
superior who instructs or directs the directors. It is not necessary to show that directors 
adopted a subservient role, surrendered their discret on or were under any compulsion to obey 
the directions or instructions, although a relationship of dominance and subservience may be 
evidence of a shadow directorship.43 
There is no distinction drawn between executive, non-executive and independent directors, 
but an important distinction is made between these typ s of directors in practice, and in the 
King III Report and the Code.44 An executive director is a director who is also an officer 
employed by the company.45 He or she is involved in the day to day management of the 
company and is the full-time salaried employ of the company.46 This implies that there is an 
existence of a service contract between the company and director.47  He has a service contract 
with the company and is thus an employee of the company.48  In Howard v Herrigel49 the 
court held that-  
“it is unhelpful and even misleading to classify company directors as ‘executive’ or 
‘non-executive’ for purposes of ascertaining their duties to the company or when any 
specific or affirmative action is required of them.” 50  
                                                          
37 Cassim (see note 3; 409). 
38 Cassim (see note 3; 409). 
39 Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC para 163. 
40 Cassim (see note 3; 410). 
41 Cassim (see note 3; 410). 
42 (2000) 2 All ER 365 para 374-376. 
43 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Deverell supra para 376. 
44 Cassim (see note 3; 411). 
45 MS Blackman…et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2008) 8-13. 
46 Blackman (see note 45; 8-13). 
47 Blackman (see note 45; 8-13). 
48 Coetzee and van Tonder (see note 35; 300). 
49 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 678. 
50 Howard v Herrigel supra para 678. 
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No such distinction is to be found in any statute. At common law, once a person accepts 
appointment as a director, that person becomes a fiduciary in relation to the company and 
obliged to display the utmost faith towards the company and in his dealings on its behalf.51 
Cassim submits that section 1 of the Act contains an open-ended, non-exhaustive definition 
of a director, which is both tautologous and unhelpful.52 
The court in Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen; Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v AWJ Investments (Pty) Ltd53 stated that non-executive 
directors are not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company. Their 
duties are of an intermittent nature to be performed at periodical board meetings, and at any 
other meetings which may require their attention.54 He or she does not have a contract with 
the company outside of board meetings and holds the position by virtue of having been 
elected by the general meeting and not by virtue of an agreement with the company.55 Cassim 
argues that one of the concerns articulated in relation to the non-executive directors is that 
since non-executive directors are only part-time dir ctors of the company they are likely to 
have other interests apart from the company, and their capacity to monitor the activities may 
be limited. Furthermore, they will necessarily have to rely on the executive directors for 
information about the company in carrying out their function.56 Thus non-executive directors 
may also lack detailed knowledge of the company’s business and affairs.57 Fiduciary duties 
extend to non-executive directors.58 Executive and non-executive directors have the same 
fiduciary duties in law.59 
Ryan states that there are several reasons for appointing non-executive directors.60 First, such 
directors may have knowledge, expertise or experience which may be used in the company’s 
best interests.61 Second, whether or not they possess any special skill such directors tend to 
take a more global view of things. In this sense they balance the executive directors who tend 
to see things from the management point of view and often get bogged down by the technical 
                                                          
51 Howard v Herrigel supra para 678. 
52 Cassim (see note 3; 509). 
53 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) para 165. 
54 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen supra, para 165. 
55 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen supra, para 165. 
56 Cassim (see note 3; 478). 
57 Cassim (see note 3; 423) 
58 MA Fouche Legal Principles of Contracts and Commercial Law. (2004) 317. 
59 Howard v Herrigel supra, para 678. 
60 Ryan (see note 24; 12). 
61 Ryan (see note 24; 12). 
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detail and problems of loyalty to their company.62 Third, a non-executive director may be 
appointed in the hope that his title, name or statu in society is such that the company’s 
reputation, sales and credit rating may be favorably enhanced.63 Lastly, a non-executive 
director may be appointed not out of choice (on the part of the directors) but because the 
holder of a large number of the company’s shares wants  representative on the board often 
with a watching brief rather than with any intentio that he should take an active role.64 
 
1.3 Qualification to serve as a director or prescribed officer 
The first directors of a company are the incorporators of the company, and such persons serve 
as directors of the company until the minimum number of required directors (in terms of 
section 67(1) of the Act or the Memorandum of Incorporation) has been appointed or 
elected.65 The Act does not prescribe minimum qualifications for a director, such as those 
relating to the education and training of directors, but instead imposes criteria that disqualify 
a person from being a director. This is derived from the fact that imposing minimum 
qualifications is regarded as an internal company policy issue.66  Cassim distinguishes 
between a person being ineligible and disqualified to be a company director. Disqualification 
is not absolute and a court has discretion to permit a d squalified person to accept an 
appointment as a director. An ineligible person is ab olutely prohibited from being a 
director.67 
Section 69 of the Companies Act provides that a person is ineligible for appointment as 
director or prescribed officer, if that person is a juristic person; an unemancipated minor or 
persons under a similar legal disability; any persons who do not satisfy any minimum 
qualification set out in the Memorandum of Incorporation in terms of s 69(6)(b); any persons 
disqualified in terms of any additional grounds of ineligibility (or disqualification) set out in 
the Memorandum of Incorporation in terms of s 69(6)(a). A director of a company must be a 
natural person. A company, a close corporation or a trust is a juristic person and may not be 
appointed as a director.  
                                                          
62 Ryan (see note 24; 12). 
63 Ryan (see note 24; 12). 
64 Ryan (see note 24; 12). 
65 Cassim (see note 3; 423). 
66 Cassim (see note 3; 431). 
67 Cassim (see note 3; 431). 
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1.4 Grounds of disqualification 
A person is disqualified from being a director or prescribed officer, if the person:68 
• Has been prohibited to be a director by the court of law. 
• Has been declared by the court to be delinquent in terms of s 162 of the Act or in 
terms of s 47 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
• Is an unrehabilitated insolvent. 
• Is prohibited in terms of any public regulation to be a director of the company. 
• Has been removed from an office of trust, on grounds of misconduct involving 
dishonestly and  
• Is a person who has been convicted in South Africa or elsewhere, and imprisoned 
without the option of a fine, or fined more than R1000 for theft, fraud, forgery, 
perjury or other offences as specified in s 69(8)(b)(iv) of the Act. 
 
The offences specified in s 69(8) (b  iv) are: 
• An offence involving fraud, misrepresentation or dishonesty; 
• An offence in connection with promotion, formation r management of a company; 
and  
• An offence under the Companies Act, the Insolvency A t 24 of 1936, the Close 
Corporation Act 69 of 1984, the Competition Act 89 of 1998, the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001, the Securities S rvices Act 36 of 2004 or Chapter 
2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
In Magna Alloys & Research (Pty) Ltd v Ellis69 the court held that these provisions are 
not designed to punish the individual but to protect he public and to prevent the corporate 
structure from being used to the financial detriment of investors, shareholders, creditors 
and persons dealing with the company. In its operation i  is calculated to act as a 
safeguard against the corporate structure being used by individuals in a manner which is 
contrary to proper commercial standards.70  
  
                                                          
68 Act 71 of 2008; s 69(8). 
69 1975 1 ACLR 203 SC (NSW) 205. 
70 Magna Alloys & Research (Pty) Ltd v Ellis supra. 
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1.5 The fiduciary relationship 
Fiduciary is derived from Latin fiduciarius, meaning ‘(holding) in trust’; from fides, meaning 
‘faith’, and fiducia, meaning ‘trust’ this clearly shows that the basis of a fiduciary relationship 
rests on the concepts of honesty, utmost trust71 and the central notion of loyalty.72 A director 
stands in a fiduciary relationship to his company with the result that he has the duty to act in 
good faith towards his company to exercise his powers as director for the benefit of the 
company and to avoid a conflict between his own interests and those of the company.73 A 
director cannot be relieved of this duty in the articles, in a contract or in any other way, any 
act amounting to evasion of this duty is seen in the same light as a breach of the duty itself.74  
In the case of Hodgkinson v Simms75 the court recognized the fact that many contracts give 
rise to fiduciary relationships and specifically recognized the existence of this in relation to 
contracts of agency and stated that: ‘the paradigm example of this class of contract is the 
agency agreement, in which the allocation of rights and responsibilities in the contract itself 
give rise to fiduciary expectations.’76 In Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd77 the court said 
that ‘there is no magic in the term fiduciary duty’. The existence of such a duty and its nature 
and extent are questions of fact to be adduced from a thorough consideration of the substance 
of the relationship and any relevant circumstances which affect the operation of that 
relationship.78 This was also confirmed in Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co, Ltd v 
Robinson79 where the court held that whether a fiduciary relationship exists depends on the 
circumstances. The above passage shows clearly that it is not easy to define this concept but 
one has to consider relevant facts when trying to ascertain whether a fiduciary duty existed in 
a particular case and cases must be decided on a case by case basis.80 Cassim submits that the 
content of the duty varies and depends on the nature of the relationship between the parties.81 
                                                          
71 K Dharmaratne ‘A consideration of whether directors should stand in a fiduciary relationship with the 
company’s related and inter-related companies’ 1 Available at http://www.cgblaw.co.za/fiduciary-
relationship.pdf. 
72 Dharmaratne (see note 71; 1). 
73 Dharmaratne (see note 71; 1). 
74 Dharmaratne (see note 71; 1). 
75 (1994) 3 SCR 377 (SCC), referred with approval in Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd & Another 2004 (3) SA 
465 (SCA) 477. 
76 2004 (3) SA 465 (SCA) para 27.  
77 Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd supra, para 27.  
78 Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd supra, para 27. 
79 1921 AD 168 at 197-98. 
80 Cassim (see note 3; 431). 
81 Cilliers (see note 4; 135). 
14 
 
There are numerous characteristics which can be imputed to the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship such as discretion, influence, and vulnerability but most importantly loyalty82 
and trust.83 The meaning of the word fiduciary is based on the concepts of honesty, good 
faith, confidence, reliance and utmost trust.84 These concepts are centralized around the 
notion of loyalty.85 
Even though the concept of ‘fiduciary duty’ has no precise definition, it is said that such duty 
arises ‘where, as a result of one person’s relationship to another, the former is bound to 
exercise rights and powers in good faith and for the benefit of the latter’.86 A fiduciary is 
defined as  
‘a person in a position of trust or occupying a positi n of power and confidence with 
respect to another, such that he is obliged by various rules of law to act solely in the 
interest of the other, whose rights he has to protect’.87  
In Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew88 the court stated that a fiduciary is someone 
who undertakes to act for or on behalf of another in circumstances that give rise to a 
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties. 
From the above discussion, it can be adduced that in a fiduciary relationship, one party is at 
the mercy of another party’s discretion. In Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical 
Corporation89 the court held that  
‘a fiduciary relationship may arise because on the facts a person has been appointed 
to act for the benefit of another whose appointment carries powers that could be 
exercised to the detriment of another’.  
A fiduciary has a special opportunity to exercise power or discretion to the detriment of 
another, who is vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary. In Frame v Smith90 the court held that 
                                                          
82 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew (1998) Ch. 1 18. 
83 Cilliers (see note 4; 141). 
84 Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel (2009) 4 All SA 497 (SCA) para 17. 
85 JS McLennan ‘Directors Fiduciary duties and the 2008 Companies Bill 2009’ (2009) 1 TSAR 184. 
86 P Hood ‘What is so special about being a fiduciary?’ (2003) 308 4 Edinburgh Law Review 30. 
87 The Oxford Companion to Law. 1980 
88 (1998) Ch. 1 para 18. 
89 (1984) 156 CLR 41 para 96-7 (HC of A), referred to with approval in Volvo (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Yssel 
2009 (4) ALL SA 497 (SCA). 
90 (1987) 2 S.C.R. para 99. 
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the relationships in which a fiduciary obligation has been imposed seem to possess three 
general characteristics namely: 
• The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power;  
• The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the  
beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; and  
• The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the 
discretion or power.  
There are various professions which may have a fiduciary relationship and the following is 
not a closed list but includes trustees, agents, partners, directors and attorneys.91 In English v 
Dedham Vale Properties Ltd92 Slate J ruled that the classes of fiduciary relationships are 
never closed but open-ended. The fiduciary duties ar  b sed firmly on loyalty, good faith and 
avoidance of conflicts of interest and duty.93 Geach submits that the 2008 Companies Act 
does not introduce anything new in section 76 regarding a director’s fiduciary duty.94 In 
Cyberscene Ltd and Others v i-Kiosk Internet and Information (Pty) Ltd95 it was confirmed 
that a director stands in the fiduciary relationship to the company of which he or she is a 
director, even if he or she is a non-executive director. The general rule is that a director is a 
fiduciary and has an overarching duty to act in good faith and for the benefit of the 
company.96  
In Parker v McKenna97 this basic duty of loyalty was held to be unbending, flexible and 
must be applied austerely by the court. These duties ar  based on the general principle that a 
person standing in a fiduciary relationship to another commits a breach of trust if he acts for 
his own benefit or to the prejudice of the other. It follows that the cause of action for a breach 
of a fiduciary duty does not derive from delict or c ntract, but is unique (sui generis). The 
remedy for breach is restitution to the company of the loss suffered by the company or the 
benefit gained by the director.98 Furthermore, in Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO99, it 
                                                          
91 Cassim (see note 1, 512). 
92 (1978) 1 WLR 93 HC. 
93 Cassim (see note 3; 509). 
94 W Geach ‘Statutory, Common Law and other duties of directors’ Paper for CIS Corporate Governance 
Conference on 10 to 11 September 2009; 10. 
95 2000 (3) SA 806 (C). 
96 Cassim (see note 3, 510).  
97 (1874) LR 10 Ch. App 96 para 124-5. 
98 Cassim (see note 3, 510). 
99 1991 (2) SA 660 (A). 
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was stated that it is a long-established principle of South African law that such a fiduciary 
duty exists and that the breach thereof is remediable by means of an interdict. In broad terms 
a fiduciary is a person who has the responsibility or is required by law to act in the best 
interest of another,100 and therefore by handling a company’s affairs the dir ctors of such a 
company owes a fiduciary duty to that company. In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold 
Mining Co Ltd101 a director of the plaintiff company had purchased property in his own name 
when his duty was to acquire the property for his company under the company’s name. The 
director then continued to sell the property to the company at an increased price. The court 
held that the company was able to hold the director liable for the profit he made as there was 
a breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
1.6 To whom do the directors owe their fiduciary duties? 
Upon the formation of a company it is a legal entity that exists separately from its 
management and shareholders.102 The general rule is that directors’ duties are owed to the 
company and not to individual shareholders, nor to the company’s creditors.103 Directors do 
not owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s individual shareholders,104 nor to its creditors 
while the company is a going concern,105 its employees,106 nor to its holding company, 
neither to its subsidiary company (at least where the subsidiary has an independent board of 
directors), nor where the company is a member of a group of companies, or to the group as a 
whole.107 The court in Re Smith & Fawcett108 held that the fundamental and paramount or 
overarching duty of company directors is to act bona fide in what they consider not what the 
court may consider to be in the interests of the company as a whole, and not for a collateral 
purpose. This was confirmed by the court in Cohen v Segal109 the court held that the director 
of a company occupies a fiduciary position towards the company and must act for the benefit 
of a company with no ulterior motives. The fundamental goal of the directors of a company is 
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the success of the company and the collective best int rests of the shareholders of the 
company. The fiduciary relationship between a director and his company arises from the 
purpose for which the director’s office and powers are entrusted to him, namely, for the 
benefit of the company.110 The broad duty owed by a director to his company is for him to act 
in good faith, in the best interests of the company.111  
In Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew112, Millet LJ had this to say-  
‘The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal 
is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several 
facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; 
he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he 
may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of athird person without the informed 
consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is 
sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining 
characteristics of the fiduciary.’113 
In Howard v Herrigel114 the court held that as soon as the person assumes an appointment as 
a director, he becomes a fiduciary in relation to the company and is obliged to display the 
utmost good faith towards the company and in his dealings on its behalf. In Percival v 
Wright,115 the court held that directors of a company are not trustees for individual 
shareholders and may purchase their shares without disclosing pending negotiations for the 
sale of the company.116 However, if a director discloses certain information to shareholders, 
he has a duty not to mislead the shareholders with respect to that information.117 The 
milestone decision of Foss v Harbottle118 embodies the rule that where any wrong has been 
done to the company, e.g. breach by a director of his duty to the company, then the company 
(i.e. the majority in general meeting) is the approriate body to decide whether or not any 
action should be taken against the wrongdoer.119 In effect it is the majority of members who 
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ratify the wrongdoer’s transgression.120 Therefore a claim may not be brought by a 
shareholder to make good a loss in the value of his shares where that loss merely reflects the 
loss suffered by the company. This is referred as the proper plaintiff rule. However the court 
in Briess v Woolley121 stated that where a director has acted for a sharehold r he will, qua 
agent owe the shareholder a fiduciary duty for all agents owe their principal such a duty. This 
was also confirmed in George Fischer (GB) Ltd v Multi-Construction Ltd122 that where the 
company had no cause of action but the shareholder di , the shareholder could recover even 
if the loss was the diminution in the value of his shareholding. 
 
1.7 Does a director owe a fiduciary duty to a subsidiary? 
As a general principle each company in a group is regarded as a separate legal entity, unless 
the court pierces the corporate veil or it is done by the legislature.123 In terms of the common 
law a director of a holding company does not owe any fiduciary duties to its subsidiary.124 
Similarly a director of a subsidiary only owes fiduciary duties to the subsidiary alone and 
does not owe fiduciary duties to the holding company.125 A director of a company only owes 
his fiduciary duties to the company on whose board he serves and not to other companies 
even if they belong to the same group.126 However, due to the power exercisable by a holding 
company over a subsidiary,127 the 2008 Act attempts to alleviate the severity of the common 
law principle by imposing a duty on directors not to use the position of director nor 
information obtained as directors to gain an advantage for the director nor for another person 
other than the company or a wholly owned subsidiary of the company nor to knowingly cause 
harm to the company or a subsidiary of the company.128 The inclusion of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary and a subsidiary in the standards of directo s’ conduct provision represents an 
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extension of the common-law principles.129 The duty extends the ambit beyond that of the 
company of which the person is a director.130 
 
1.8 Do directors owe a duty to employees and the company’s creditors or society in 
general? 
The general rule is that directors owe their fiduciary duty to the company of which he or she 
is a director.131 The court in Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd132 held that directors 
do not owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s creditors except where the company is 
insolvent or nearly insolvent. Another matter that deserves to be considered is whether 
company directors owe a duty to the company employees. It was decided in the case of 
Hutton v West Cork Railway Company133 that directors owe their duties only to the company 
and not to the company’s employees or society in general. There has been development 
towards the imposition of a fiduciary duty towards the shareholders in the United Kingdom 
and United States of America but this is not yet evid nt in South African law.134  
However, this broader underlying philosophy that directors owe their duties only to the 
company and for the ultimate benefit of the shareholders and not to the company’s employees 
or society in general is outdated. In support of this view the court in Hutton v West Cork 
Railway Company135, Bowen LJ observed that, ‘the law does not say that there are to be no 
cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as required for the benefit of 
the company.’ This view advances the notion that a company and its directors are permitted 
to provide gratuitous benefits to advance the interests of the company. Ryan submits that 
modern corporate government is based on the idea that directors can have regard to wider 
range of interests, including the interests of employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the 
protection of the environment and the community at large.136 Sealy argues that ‘a 
fundamental change has taken place in the concept of the company. The company is no 
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longer regarded as an instrument of profit maximization for the sole benefits of its 
shareholders.137 It is generally recognized that the company as an economic unit consists of 
combination of several interests, namely those of its shareholders as providers of capital, 
employees as providers of labour, creditors and of the public as such. The concept of the 
company as an instrument of economic capitalism has thus developed into one of the 
enterprise as an instrument of a new social order. The modern concept of enterprise is 
founded on the theory of social responsibility.138  
 
1.9 Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, it can be argued that a director of a company has a duty of trust 
relationship with the company, and he should not breach his contractual duty held in trust. A 
director does not owe any fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders but owes this duty 
only to the company. The general principle is that a director stands in a position of trust 
towards a company and the company’s shareholders as a whole, and as a result a director has 
a duty to act in good faith and for the benefit of his/her company.139 It was argued that there 
are different types of directors and that there is no distinction between executive, non-
executive and independent directors but an important distinction is made between them in 
practice. Furthermore, the fiduciary duty of a director of a company is synonymous with the 
fiduciary duty owed to the beneficiary due to the fact that both requires fiduciaries to act bona 
fide to the company or beneficiary respectively.140  
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This chapter will focus on the common law fiduciary duties of directors. These are the duty to 
act in good faith and in the best interests of the company, the duty to act for a proper purpose, 
duty to exercise an independent business judgment and the duty to avoid conflict of interest. 
This will be done by detailing the content of the aforementioned duties of directors in regard 
to the directors of companies.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
It has been established that directors need to observe two principal duties. The first duty is a 
fiduciary duty, and the second duty is a duty of care and skill. The effect of these duties is not 
to impose any positive obligations upon the ordinary di ector to act at all, but only to set the 
parameters within which he must stay should he in fact decide to act.141 The typical fiduciary 
duties of directors are the duty of good faith and loyalty, and the duty to act in the best 
interests of the company.142 These duties were derived from 18th and 19th century English 
company law which was judicially created and develop d through continuous interpretation 
and application in case law.143 Director’s duty of care and skill is another duty for the director 
which is not a fiduciary duty but a completely separate branch on its own, which in essence 
comprises the duty to not act negligently in the carrying out of their duties.144 Their object is 
to raise the standard of corporate or directorial behavior. Firstly, I will discuss the common 
law director’s duty to act in good faith and in the b st interests of the company. 
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2.2 Common law perspective of the duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of 
the company 
Dine argues that there is one fundamental duty, the duty to act in good faith for the benefit of 
the company and that conduct which is in breach of t e other duties which we have identified 
is conduct which causes the director to be likely to be in breach of that fundamental duty.145 
A breach of a fiduciary duty can be ratified unless it i  a breach of the fundamental duty to 
act in good faith and in the interests of the company.146 The common law duty to act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the company is the paramount and overarching fiduciary duty 
of directors from which all other fiduciary duties are derived.147 Good faith is defined as “a 
state of mind consisting in (1) honesty of believe or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one’s duty or 
obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade 
or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage” and is 
alternatively known as “bona fides.148  Generally, good faith is an honest, faithful, sincere, 
and reasonable belief that one is doing the right thing.149 This duty is commonly described as 
one of absolute loyalty/honesty150 and utmost good faith to the company.151 This is a 
subjective duty as the courts will not interfere with a director’s decision, where they honestly 
believe that decision was for the benefit of the company as a whole as Lord Greene MR 
stated in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd.152 The general rule is that the interests of the company are 
the interests of the shareholders as a general body. Furthermore, directors should treat the 
company as a going concern and consider the interests of both present and future 
shareholders. Directors may not exercise their powers for the benefit of the company as a 
legal or commercial entity distinct from the shareholders, and they may not favour one 
section of shareholders over another.153  
Buckley J in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd154found that this means that directors would be in 
breach of their duty to the company if they acted either:  
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1) not bona fide in the interests of the company (in other words, a subjective test155); or  
2) for some improper purpose (in other words an objectiv  test) even if they themselves 
believed reasonably that they were acting bona fide in the interests of the company.156 
The court in Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd157 found that directors of a 
company have more knowledge, time and expertise at their disposal to evaluate the best 
interests of the company than judges. The courts will not presume to act as a kind of 
supervisory board over directors’ decisions that are honestly arrived at within the powers of 
their management.158 The court in Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd159 stated that it was not for the 
courts to review the merits of a decision that the dir ctors arrived at honestly.  
A director’s duty is thus to act in what he or she in a good faith honesty considers to be in the 
best interests of the company. Ryan argued that a director should take account of the interests 
of shareholders and also, now, of the company’s employees.160 But the interests of customers, 
creditors, the community at large, and his personal interests and those of the family are not 
relevant considerations unless the proposed action is intended to benefit the company.161 As 
has been stated above that this duty is subjective and its breach requires subjective awareness 
of wrongdoing.162 
However there are limits to the subjective test in that the absence of a reasonable ground for 
believing that the director is acting in the interests of the company may be the basis for 
finding lack of good faith.163 The court in Shuttleworth v Cox164 stressed that the best interests 
of the company are not assessed by the court itself; instead, the test is whether a reasonable 
man would have regarded the act of the directors to be in the best interests of the company.165 
This was also emphasized in Teck Corp Ltd v Millar166 where it was stated that there must be 
reasonable grounds for the directors’ belief that tey were acting in the best interests of the 
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company. It was also held in Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood167 that there 
must be reasonable grounds for the believing that the directors were acting in the interests of 
the company.  
The court in Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyd’s Bank168 formulated the test that the 
relevant inquiry is: whether an intelligent and honest person in the position of the director 
could in the whole of the circumstances have reasonbly believed that he or she was acting in 
the best interest of the company.169  
For instance, where a director of a gown manufacturing company who was in poor health 
entered into a new service agreement which made provision for a generous pension for his 
widow in the event of his death, that service agreem nt was held not to have been entered 
into bona fide in the interests of the company.170 This principle was confirmed in Neptune 
(Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald No 2171 where the court held that apart from 
any issue of self-dealing, the sole director of a company had not acted in the interests of the 
company by arranging for the company to make gratuitous or redundancy payments to him 
on the termination of his service contract with the company. The company director was held 
to have acted in his own interests, rather than in the company’s interests.172 
The director’s duty to act in good faith and for the best interest of the company was well 
established in Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd173, wherein the company’s articles of association gave 
the board of directors an ‘absolute and uncontrolled discretion to refuse to register any 
transfer of shares’. When one director passed away the other surviving directors refused to 
register a transfer of his shares into the name of the executors. The court held that in terms of 
the articles of association of the company, the only limitation on the directors’ powers was 
that they had to act in a manner that they believed to be in the best interest of the company.174 
Therefore, the court could not establish any evidence sufficient enough to justify mala fides, 
or bad faith and therefore refused to set aside the decision of the board of directors.175  
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The rationale behind the decision in Re Smith176 case is that a court would not set aside the 
decision of the board, even if the decision in question does not seem to be the most logical or 
a fair decision that could have been reached by the board. The court will only set aside a 
decision taken by the board if it is clear that there is presence of mala fides, by virtue of the 
fact that the directors did not act in good faith and in the best interest of the company when 
making that decision in question.177   
 
2.3 Common law perspective of the duty to act for proper purpose 
It is generally accepted that the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company and the 
duty to act for proper purposes are two distinct duties.178 At common law, “proper purpose” 
means that directors must exercise their powers for the objective purpose for which the power 
was given to them and not for a collateral or ulterior purpose.179 Directors are required to 
exercise their powers and perform their functions in good faith and for a proper purpose, with 
the overarching promotional purpose being the best interests of the company. This is a 
fundamental duty which qualifies the exercising of any of the powers which the directors in 
fact have.180 In Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd181 the company was in the 
process of avoiding a hostile take-over bid to acquire the company for much less than the 
book value of the company, calculated on the basis of land owned by the company. 
Furthermore, the company set a scheme in motion to sell the land to subsidiary for 
development purposes, by means of which the subsidiary as a partner would challenge the 
hostile bid to acquire control of the company. The court considered whether the partnership 
or joint venture agreement was for a proper purpose. In this regard, three different opinions 
were expressed in the law. Mahoney J focused on the beli f of the director that the scheme 
was in the best interest of the company, whilst Clarke JA distinguished the factual 
circumstances from the Hogg and Whitehouse cases, since no allotment of shares was made 
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and lastly Kirby J concluded that honesty when deciing on the proper purpose of the scheme 
should be an objective inquiry:182  
It would be to ignore the many blunt reminders of their obligation to conduct a 
thoroughgoing investigation. It would be to sustain  passive conception of the duty of 
a fiduciary which has no place in company board rooms. Higher standards of 
vigilance and honesty are required there in dealing with other people’ moneys. 
Furthermore, the court stated that it is an abuse of power for directors to exercise their powers 
for a purpose other than the purpose for which the power was conferred on them. The 
existence of subjective good faith is insufficient to save the purported exercise of power, if 
the power was exercised for a collateral purpose.183 The duty to act for proper purposes is 
important because it is a flexible and useful tool which enables the court to review the 
directors’ decisions.184  
In Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd185 the board of directors issued additional shares in an attempt to 
avoid a hostile take-over. Although the directors honestly believed that the allotment was in 
the best interest of the company, the court nevertheless held that an objective inquiry should 
be employed when considering the reason for additional allotment.186 The court held that the 
majority of shareholders were acting oppressively towards the minority of shareholders 
and/or that powers of directors interfered with the s areholder rights as stipulated in the 
company’s constitution.187 Buckley J found that the manipulation of the voting position could 
not therefore be found to be within the bounds of acting for a proper purpose. Finally, the 
court held that the issuing of shares could be ratified by the members at a general meeting. 
The court emphasized that it was unconstitutional for the directors to exercise their fiduciary 
powers to issue shares of the company in order to defeat a takeover bid, or for the purpose of 
destroying an existing majority or to create a new majority.188 
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In a similar case of Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd189 where the board of directors 
awarded further shares to Howard Smith whom they prferred in order to dilute the majority 
shareholding of Ampol Petroleum and assist in assuring the take-over bid by Howard Smith. 
The court found that it was unconstitutional for the directors to use their fiduciary power for 
the sole purpose of destroying the existing majority or creating a new majority. The court also 
noted that this would apply even if the directors believed in good faith that they were acting 
in the best interest of the company and they were not going to receive any personal benefit or 
advantage for themselves including retaining their position as directors. It was concluded that 
the principle was clear; no board of directors may interfere with the constitutional right of 
shareholders to decide the outcome of a take-over bid.190  
Although, the above proposition was favoured by the Australian High Court in Whitehouse v 
Carlton Hotel (Pty) Ltd, the High Court did introduce new changes in the adaptation of the 
proper purpose doctrine.191 In this case Mr Whitehouse tried to influence the composition of 
shareholders by allotting additional shares to avoid a future circumstance where his spouse 
would control the company in the event of his death. This act was done honestly and in the 
best interest of the company. However, the court used the “but for” test and held that the 
purpose of this “exercise” was to manipulate the voting power of shareholders, irrespective of 
whether a valid reason/causation did exist to support the manipulation.192 In Punt v Symons & 
Co Ltd193 the board of directors issued shares to their friends and supporters with the 
intention of creating a sufficient majority which would result in them being able to pass a 
special resolution that would allow them to change the constitution of the company so as to 
deny certain shareholders special rights that were conferred on them by the company’s 
constitution. Correspondingly, in Piercy v Mills194 the directors of the company issued shares 
with the intention of creating sufficient majority n order to resist the election of additional 
directors that would have resulted in the incumbent directors becoming a minority on the 
board. The court in both cases held that the directo s exercised their powers for an improper 
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purpose195 and that the issuing of shares in order to manipulate the balance of voting power 
amounts to improper exercise of the power to issue hares.196    
It would clearly be an improper purpose if the directors were to use their power over the 
company’s shares simply in order to benefit themselves, or in order to destroy an existing 
majority or create a new one.197 This would be interfering with the constitution of the 
company – the shareholders in a general meeting which is separate from and set against their 
own powers.198 Beuthin argues that if members of the board bona fide believe that they are in 
fact exercising a power for a proper purpose, the court will be reluctant to interfere, but if the 
question arises whether something was done for a paticul r purpose or not, the court will 
look at the matter objectively to estimate how pressing that purpose was.199 However, if the 
court finds out that it was not pressing, it may disbelieve the directors and find in fact that 
their purpose or their primary purpose was some othr purpose which was an improper 
one.200 
The issue by the court of determining from the facts of a particular case the purpose for 
which a director has exercised his or her power is not an effortless task.201 The court in Mills 
v Mills202 held that if there are multiple purposes for the exrcise of a power, the court must 
determine what the substantial or dominant purpose was. If the dominant purpose is found to 
be improper, the court must regard the exercise of the power as being voidable.    
For the exercise of power to be considered as valid, the impermissible purpose must not be 
causative in the sense that, but for its presence, the power would not have been exercised.203 
On the other hand, if the exercise of the power is found to be proper and in the interests of the 
company, the fact that an incidental effect of it is o defeat a takeover bid or to enable the 
directors to maintain themselves in office will not make the exercise of the power 
improper.204   
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In Extrasure Travel Insurances Ltd v Scattergood205 the court stated that the law relating to 
proper purpose is clear. It is not necessary to prove that a director was dishonest or that the 
director knew that he or she was pursuing a collateral purpose. The court developed a four 
step- test which has to be applied in order to determine conduct relating to proper purpose. 
The test indicates that a court must:   
• identify the particular power that is being challeng d; 
• identify the proper purpose for which the power was given to the directors; 
• identify the substantial purpose for which the power as in fact exercised; and 
• decide whether the purpose was proper. 
Du Plessis on the other hand proposed another test that should be followed by South African 
courts in cases where there were permissible and imper issible purposes, whether the actions 
of the directors should or should not be set aside.206  The first step in the test is to determine 
what the purpose for which the power was conferred to the directors of the company.207 The 
court did take cognizance of the fact that there may be multiple purposes; in such a case the 
principle or dominant purpose must be identified. Once the purpose of the power has been 
determined, the second step will be to determine whther, in light of the particular facts of the 
case, the directors misused the powers conferred upon them.208 This test entails whether the 
decision was primarily or substantially taken within the purpose for which the power was 
conferred upon the directors (as determined as in the first step). The court will not set such a 
decision aside irrespective of the fact that partially or incidentally the power might have been 
exercised for an improper or impermissible purpose.209 Conversely, if the decision was 
primarily or substantially taken for an improper or impermissible purpose, the court will set 
such decision aside irrespective of the fact that partially or incidentally the power might have 
been exercised for a proper purpose.210   
Once the court has determined that primarily or substantially the power was misused, it will 
not help the directors who allege that they had not gained personally or that they had acted 
honestly: the conduct of the directors under attack will then be set aside because of the breach 
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of their strict fiduciary duty to exercise their powers for the purpose for which the power was 
conferred upon them. In this regard, there is no difference between cases where directors 
made a profit by reason and by virtue of their fiduciary office as directors, and the misuse of 
powers.211  
In a case where the court must consider whether a pa ticular power has been exercised for its 
proper purpose, the court will not hear the directors’ defence that they have acted in the best 
interest of the company as a whole in exercising the particular power.212 The crucial issue is 
often not the interest of the company, but the interest of shareholders and what is fair between 
different classes of shareholders.213   
 
2.4 Common law perspective of the duty to exercise an independent judgment 
Directors must in general not fetter their discretion.214 This means that they must not enter 
into an agreement with a third party as to how they will exercise their discretion. To do so 
would prevent them from exercising an independent judgment at the appropriate time.215 
Ryan argues that a director must not as a general rule fetter his discretion, for example, by 
contracting with an outsider to vote in a particular w y at board meetings.216 He submits that 
if directors enter into a contract on behalf of the company which they consider to be to the 
company’s benefit they may agree to vote in favour of any necessary subsequent action.217 
The effect of such a voting agreement, if it were to be binding, is that the directors thereby 
disable themselves from acting honestly in what they believe to be the best interests of the 
company.218 In an Australian case of Thorby v Goldberg219 the directors of a company who 
were also shareholders agreed with potential sharehold rs, inter alia, to alter the company’s 
articles and provide for the issue and allotment of fresh shares. The court considered the 
agreement to be valid: 
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“there are many kinds of transactions in which the proper time for the exercise of the 
directors’ discretion is the time of the negotiation f a contract, and not the time at 
which the contract is to be performed. If at the former time they are bona fide of the 
opinion that it is in the best interests of the company that the transaction should be 
entered into and carried into effect, I see no reason in law why they should not bind 
themselves to do whatever under the transaction is to be done by the board.”220  
Thorby’s decision was followed in Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates Plc221, where a 
football club and its directors undertook in return for substantial payment to vote in a 
particular way. The court rejected the contention that he board of directors may never make a 
contract by which they bind themselves to the future exercise of their powers in a particular 
way, even though the contract as a whole is manifestly for the benefit of the company. The 
board was in this case binding itself under commercial contract which had conferred benefits 
on the company and which at the time the board had honestly believed was in the best 
interests of the company. In this case the court stated: 
“It is trite that directors are under a duty to act bona fide in the interests of their 
company. However, it does not follow from that proposition that directors can never 
make a contract by which they bind themselves to the future exercise of their powers 
in a particular manner, even though the contract taken as a whole is manifestly for 
the benefit of the company. Such a rule could well pr vent companies from entering 
into contracts which were commercially beneficial to them.” 222 
It must be stated that a company would not escape contractual obligations that have willingly 
been undertaken by its directors on the basis of their alleged failure to exercise an 
independent judgment. Cassim distinguishes between a situation in which the entire board of 
directors has entered into such an agreement and one in which an individual director has done 
so.223 The former but not the latter may in certain circumstances be beyond reproach, as 
shown in the Fulham Football Club case.224 
The duty to exercise an independent judgment is particularly important to nominee directors. 
It must be borne in mind that a nominee director is a person appointed by a nominator to 
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represent his or her interests at board meetings.225 A nominee director is a lawfully elected 
director and is obliged to act under a duty to his nominator while he owes a fiduciary duty to 
the company.226 The court in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale v Meyer227 uled that there is 
nothing inherently dishonest or improper about nominee directors. Irrespective of these two 
separate duties a nominee director is expected to bring an independent and unfettered mind in 
what he consider being in the best interest of the company. A nominee director may not be a 
dummy or a puppet. The court in S v Shaban228 cautioned that ‘puppets’ cannot be lawfully 
employed in our company law system. Puppets refers to a person placed on the board of 
directors of a company who pretend to have taken part in resolutions of which they know 
nothing, or persons who pretend to have taken part in the management of a company while 
having no idea what they have signed.229 In S v De Jager230 where a director who had 
formally resigned as a director and had been appointed a puppet director was held to be a 
director despite his resignation. 
In Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen231 with regard to the nominee 
directors it was held that a director is in that capacity not the servant or agent of the 
shareholders who votes for or otherwise procures his appointment to the board. The court 
stated that the director’s duty is to observe the utmost good faith towards the company, and in 
discharging that duty he is required to exercise an independent judgment and to take 
decisions according to the best interests of the company.232 Even though nominee directors 
may in fact be representing the interests of the persons who nominated them, they are in law 
obliged to serve the interests of the company to the exclusion of the interests of their 
nominators.233  
Therefore, it can be argued that upon being appointed as a nominee director, such a person 
has to take the interests of his or her nominator int  account without breaching his fiduciary 
duties to the company.234 This means that nominee directors must not blindly fol ow the 
instructions of those who have appointed them; nor, i  the event of a conflict of interests, 
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must they prefer the interests of their nominator above that of a company of which they prefer 
are directors.235  A more flexible approach in the exercise of an independent judgment rule by 
a nominator has been adopted in Australia and New Zaland and it may well influence the 
courts in South Africa to follow this trend towards a flexible approach rather than a strict 
rigid approach to nominee directors.236 
 
2.5 Common law perspective of the duty to avoid conflict of interests 
In contrast to the lenient attitude towards the dirctor’s performance of their duty of care and 
skill, the law in this area has always appeared to be extremely strict, so it was thought that a 
director was forbidden from entering into an arrangement in which there was a possibility 
that a director’s personal interests could conflict with his duty.237 It is a well-entrenched 
principle of corporate law that a director has a fiduciary duty not to make a secret profit out 
of his trust, and generally must not place himself in a position in which his duty and self-
interest may conflict.238 The duty to avoid a conflict of interest is one of the most important 
fiduciary duties of directors. The common law duty to avoid conflict of interests was 
influenced by the case of Keech v Sandford239.  The directors of a company as fiduciaries are 
under a fiduciary duty to avoid placing themselves in a position in which their duties to the 
company conflict with their personal interests.240 In particular this applies to the exploitation 
of any property, information or opportunity available to the company. It applies whether the 
company could or could not take advantage of such property, information or opportunity.241 
As such, they are not allowed to make profit or retain a profit made by them in the course of 
and by means of their office as directors. This test en ures that the profit made by directors, 
as it derives from their position as directors are disgorged by them. Ryan argues that the law 
in this area has always been extremely strict, so it was thought that a director was forbidden 
from entering into an arrangement in which there was a possibility that the directors’ interests 
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could conflict with his duty.242 The court in Parker v McKenna243 held that this rule is 
inflexible and must be applied inexorably by a court.244 This fundamental and inflexible legal 
principle was enunciated in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros245 where the court stated: 
“It is a rule of universal application that no one having such duties to discharge, 
shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which e as or can have, a personal 
interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interest of those whom he 
is bound to protect. So strictly is this principle adhered to, that no question is allowed 
to be raised as to the fairness or unfairness of a contract so entered into.” 
In Boardman v Phipps246 the court explained the phrase ‘possibly may conflict’ in the above 
extract from Aberdeen Railway Co to mean that where a reasonable man looking at the 
relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case would think that there was a real, 
sensible possibility of conflict. Similarly, the court in Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold 
Mining Co Ltd247 declared that no one who has a duty to perform shall place himself in a 
situation where his interests conflict with his duty. The chief objective of the no-profit rule is 
to preclude directors from misusing or making improper use of their positions as directors for 
their own personal advantage.248 This broad principle to avoid conflict of interest i  
subdivided into two separate and independent but closely related categories, namely the 
corporate opportunity rule and the no-profit rule.249  
 
2.5.1 The corporate opportunity rule 
Although there is no settled definition of “corporate opportunity”,250 this expression connotes 
any economic or business opportunity, whether property or rights, which rightfully belongs to 
the company or to which the company has some kind of claim.251 As a general principle, “a 
man who stands in a position of trust towards another cannot in matters affected by that 
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position, advance his own interests (e.g. by making a profit) at that other’s expense.”252 For 
instance, a director cannot acquire a property that constitutes a corporate opportunity and 
resell it to the company at a profit. The law does not give effect to his or her intention; it 
treats the acquisition as one made in the interests of the company.253 Clearly a director acts in 
breach of his fiduciary duty to the company where he sabotages the company’s contractual 
opportunities for his own advantage, or where he uses confidential information to advance the 
interest of a rival concern or his own business to the prejudice of those of the employer 
company.254 In very broad terms, a director has a duty not to misappropriate corporate 
opportunities.255 Blackman in LAWSA256 stated that there are at least three situations in wh ch 
the duty attaches to a director. These are:257 
(i) If the director has been expressly or impliedly given a specific mandate either to 
acquire a particular opportunity for the company or to inform the company as to 
it’s suitability. 
(ii)  If he alone, or together with other directors, is given expressly or impliedly a 
general mandate to acquire opportunities for the company, or to pass on 
information to it about opportunities, or if he in fact controls the company or those 
in power to manage its affairs. 
(iii)  If he usurps an opportunity which the company is actively pursuing or an 
opportunity which at least in so far as its directors are concerned can be said to 
belong to the company. 
Since the opportunity belongs to the company, it is a breach of fiduciary duty for directors to 
divert the opportunity for themselves.258 Only recently, the court in Da Silva v CH Chemicals 
(Pty) Ltd259 regarded the corporate opportunity rule as an aspect of the no-profit rule or the 
rule against secret profits.260  The court also approved the corporate opportunity rule by 
stating that: 
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“A consequence of the rule is that a director is in certain circumstances obliged to 
acquire an economic opportunity for the company if it is acquired at all. Such an 
opportunity is said to be a ‘corporate opportunity’ or one which is the ‘property’ of 
the company.” 261 
It was also pointed out that a corporate opportunity is one that the company was actively 
pursuing or one that can be said to fall within the company’s ‘existing or prospective business 
activities’, or that is related to the operations of the company within the scope of its business 
or that falls within its line of business.262 The court in Da Silva held that it does not matter 
whether the opportunity would not have been taken up by the company - the opportunity 
would remain a corporate opportunity.263 The court in Canadian Aero Services Ltd v O’ 
Malley264 held that directors or senior officers may not usurp or divert for themselves, or for 
another person or another company with which they ar  associated, a maturing business 
opportunity which their company is actively pursuing. The court also developed factors (non-
exhaustive list) that have to be taken into account in determining the breach of the corporate 
rule, or the duty to avoid a conflict of interest from which the former is derived. These 
factors: 
• position held by the defendant, 
• nature of the corporate opportunity, 
• its ripeness,  
• the circumstances in which it was obtained, and  
• the director’s position in relation to it.265 
The courts have made rulings in regard to the corporate opportunity rule in the following 
illustrative cases. In Cook v Deeks266 three of the four directors who had equal share in the 
railway construction company, decided to appropriate for themselves a new, lucrative 
construction contract that was expected to be offered to the T Co by the Canadian Pacific 
Railway Co, which had previous dealings with T Co. Further, the contract involved a 
continuation of a railway line that had already been laid by T Co.267 By virtue of their 
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majority shareholding in the company, the three dirctors passed a resolution which favoured 
the appropriation of the contract for themselves. The court held that the benefit of the contract 
belonged to T Co and the resolution was declared voi  ab initio.268 The case of Cooks v 
Deeks269 also illustrates that the distinction between the no-profit rule and the corporate 
opportunity rule is that the no-profit rule requires the consent of a majority of the 
shareholders for the director to retain the profit made by him or her. On the other hand the 
corporate opportunity rule requires the unanimous approval of the shareholders for a director 
to take the opportunity for him or herself.270 
In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd271, Robinson, a director and 
chairperson of the board of directors of the plaintiff company, had purchased a farm for 
himself through an agent when the company could not reach finality with the sellers. He then 
sold the farm to the company at a massive profit.272 The court ruled that the company was 
entitled to claim the profit made by Robinson on the basis that, where a man stands in a 
position of confidence in relation to another, involving a duty to protect the interests of that 
other, he is not permitted to make a secret profit at the expense of the other or to place 
himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty.273 
In Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley274 the defendant, an architect and 
managing director of the plaintiff company had entered into negotiations with Eastern Gas 
Board to secure a lucrative project pending to design a depot.275 The Eastern Gas Board was 
not willing to enter into any dealings with the plaintiff company, but only directly with the 
defendant. The defendant then told the board of IDC group that he was unwell and requested 
that he be allowed to resign from his job on early notice.276 The board acquiesced and 
accepted his resignation. He then undertook the design work for the Gas Board on his own 
account. Roskill J found that the defendant had placed himself in a position in which his duty 
to the company had conflicted with his personal interests. He had one capacity at the time and 
that was as managing director of the plaintiff company.277 Cassim argues that the basis of this 
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decision was the no-conflict rule and the fact thate defendant had used for himself 
information that had come to him in his capacity as a managing director.278 But it is cogently 
arguable that the case concerned a corporate opportunity hat belonged to the company, on 
the basis that the board of the company had not made any decision to abandon the possibility 
of obtaining the contract from the Eastern Gas Board.279 
A more strict approach was adopted in Bhullar v Bhullar280, which approved of and followed 
Cooley case. The court strongly reaffirmed that the no-profit and the no-conflict rule remain 
universal and inflexible.281  
In Da Silva v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd282 Resinex, a company engaged in the distribution of 
chemical and plastic products, wished to enter the South African market and was 
contemplating either entering into a joint venture with the respondent, CH Chemical (CHC) 
or alternatively, establishing its own business in South Africa in competition with CHC.283 
The first appellant, Da Silva, the managing director of CHC, had handled its negotiations 
with Resinex. Resinex subsequently informed Da Silva that it had decided against 
collaborating with CHC and would instead enter the South African market on its own by 
setting up two South African subsidiaries.284 Da Silva was offered a position as a managing 
director of these subsidiaries and he did not inform CHC of the offer at that stage but 
continued to negotiate with Resinex on behalf of CHC.285 Eventually Da Silva accepted the 
offer made by Resinex, they entered into an agreement under which Da Silva was to establish 
the two South African subsidiaries of Resinex (a holding company and the other, a trading 
company).286 During his notice period with CHC, Da Silva acquired two shelf companies 
which subsequently became the two subsidiaries of Resinex.287 During his notice period, Da 
Silva also purchased and then sold on behalf of the trading subsidiary of Resinex three 
containers of LLDPE, a plastic product (the LLDPE transaction).288 When this was apparent 
to the CHC they sought to institute action against Da Silva for breach of his fiduciary duty to 
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avoid conflict of interests for which it sought disgorgement of profits and damages. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that directors may not make secret profit or otherwise place 
themselves in a position where their fiduciary duties conflict with their personal interests.  
Such opportunity is said to be a ‘corporate opportunity’ or one which is the property of the 
company. If it is acquired by the director, not forthe company but for himself or herself, the 
law will refuse to give effect to the director’s inte tion and will treat the acquisition as having 
been made for the company.289 It was not a breach of fiduciary duty for a managig director 
serving his notice period merely to incorporate a company that, in future, would compete 
with his existing employer or to obtain premises for the future companies (as Da Silva had 
done). These actions amounted to preparatory steps taken to enable the director to obtain 
alternative employment.290 However, by purchasing and selling the containers of LLDPE on 
behalf of the Resinex subsidiaries, while still serving his notice period with CHC, Da Silva 
had clearly breached his fiduciary duty to CHC. This was due to the fact that the transaction 
involved the purchase and sale of plastic products which fell within the scope of the business 
of CHC.291 The court found that it was not a breach of fiduciary duty for a managing director 
serving his notice period to incorporate a company that, in future, would compete with his 
existing employer.292 However, by purchasing and selling the containers of LLDPE on behalf 
of the Resinex subsidiaries, while still serving his notice period with CHC, Da Silva had 
clearly violated his fiduciary duty to CHC. This was because any transaction involving the 
purchase and sale of plastic products fell within te scope of the business of CHC.293 The 
court also examined whether Da Silva had breached his fiduciary duty to CHC by agreeing to 
set up the subsidiaries of Resinex in South Africa, and to be appointed as their managing 
director, had exploited an opportunity belonging to CHC to establish some form of 
collaboration with Resinex in South Africa.294 The court concluded that Da Silva had not 
breached his fiduciary duty to CHC insofar as the Resinex transaction was concerned. It 
reasoned that Resinex had decided to extend it operation to South Africa, and had two 
choices: either to enter the market in competition with CHC or to do so in collaboration with 
CHC – it was one or the other.295  
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 Cassim questioned the decision of the court on the Resinex transaction which is open to 
criticism on three grounds.296 Firstly, the court’s analysis of the corporate opprtunity 
doctrine is debatable. Secondly, the court concluded its analysis after interrogating the 
corporate opportunity rule, but failed to consider the no-profit rule. Lastly, the court did not 
take account of the broader rule that a director may not place himself in a position of conflict 
of interest. 
 
2.5.2 No profit rule 
The other element of the duty to avoid conflict of interest is the no profit rule. This rule 
stipulates that directors may not retain any profit made by them in their capacity as directors 
while performing their duties as directors.297 It is argued that profits made by them by reason 
of, and in the course of his or her office as directors must be disgorged, unless the majority of 
shareholders in general meeting have consented to the director making profit.298 The no profit 
rule is justified as a prophylactic rule,299 meaning that liability arises regardless of whether 
the company itself could have the opportunity and rega dless of whether the director acted in 
good faith.300 It should be noted that ‘profit’ is not confined to money, but includes every 
gain or advantage by a scoundrel directors.301 
The strict application of the no-profit rule is best illustrated by Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver.302 Regal owned a cinema in Hastings. They took out leases on two more cinemas, 
through a new subsidiary, to make the whole lot an attractive sale package. However, the 
landlord first wanted them to give personal guarantees. They did not want to do that. Instead 
the landlord said they could up share capital to £5,000.303 Regal itself put in £2,000, but could 
not afford more (though it could have got a loan). Four directors each put in £500, the 
Chairman, Mr Gulliver, got outside subscribers to put in £500 and the board asked the 
company solicitor, Mr Garten, to put in the last £500.304 They sold the business and made a 
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profit of nearly £3 per share. But then the buyers brought an action against the directors, 
saying that this profit was in breach of their fiduciary duty to the company.305 They had not 
gained fully informed consent from the shareholders. The House of Lords, reversing the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal, held that the defendants had made their profits “by reason of 
the fact that they were directors of Regal and in the course of the execution of that office.”306 
They therefore had to account for their profits to the company. Ironically, the company’s 
attorney and the outsider who had also purchased share  were able to keep the profits made 
by them on the sale of their shares since they owed no fiduciary duty to the company.307 
The no-profit and no-conflict rule were also affirmed by the court in Phillips v Fieldstone 
Africa (Pty) Ltd308 as a strict rules that allow little room for exception.309 The court in 
Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros310 held that the rule xtends not only to actual conflicts 
of interest, but also to situations in which there is a real sensible possibility of conflict. In 
Phillips v Fieldstone311 the court stated that once a breach of fiduciary dut is found, it is of 
no relevance that the company has suffered no loss or damage or that the profit was not made 
at the expense of the company; nor is it relevant that the company could not have made use of 
the opportunity or information. In Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’ Malley312 the court stated 
that: 
“An examination of the case law in this court and i the courts of other like 
jurisdiction on the fiduciary duties of directors and senior officers shows the 
pervasiveness of a strict ethic in this area of the law. In my opinion, this ethic 
disqualifies a director or senior officer from usurping for himself or diverting to 
another person or company with whom or with which he is associated a maturing 
business opportunity which his company is actively pursuing; he is also precluded 
from so acting even after his resignation where the resignation may fairly be said to 
have been prompted or influenced by a wish to acquire for himself the opportunity 
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sought by the company, or where it was his position with the company rather than a 
fresh initiative that led him to the opportunity which he later acquired.”313  
Furthermore, the court in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O’ Malley314 stipulated that in some 
instances a profit may be disgorged although it was not gained at the expense of the 
company. This is owed to the fact that directors are fiduciary and should not be allowed to 
make profit even if it was not open to the company. 
It must be submitted that financial inability may be a reason for a company’s failure to 
acquire a corporate opportunity. Most commonwealth decisions refuse corporate inability, or 
rejection of the particular opportunity by the company by the company as a defence315 for the 
director to acquire a corporate opportunity. In the United States of America, courts seem to 
accept that the financial inability of a corporation t  take up a corporate opportunity absolves 
directors from liability for making personal use of opportunity, subject to certain restrictions 
which are quite broad in scope.316 The matter is still unsettled in South Africa. It is submitted 
that directors should be allowed to acquire the corporate opportunity if the company is 
financially unable to do so or has genuinely rejected i . 
It is also submitted that a director cannot divest himself of his duty by resigning from the 
company.317 In Magnus Diamond Mining Syndicate v Macdonald and Hawthorne,318 
Maasdorp, CJ held that the fact that the defendants resigned their directorships did not affect 
their position in any way. “That resignation was merely an attempt to divest themselves of the 
responsibilities and obligations of their office, from which they could not in law free 
themselves without the consent of the corporation.”319 Where a director’s resignation is 
influenced by a wish to acquire for himself or herself an opportunity, or where his position 
with the company, rather than a fresh initiative, led him to the opportunity, he remains 
precluded from taking it.320 In Industrial Development Consultant Ltd v Cooley,321 the 
defendant was a managing director and resigned from his office in order to benefit from the 
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opportunity he had received due to his position. In fact, he misrepresented his state of health 
and was released from his directorship. He used the opportunity received and acquired 
employment. The court held that he had to account for the plaintiff company.322 In London 
and Mashonaland Exploitation Co v New Mashonaland Exploitation Co323, the court held 
that if it is:  
“not appearing from the regulations from company that a director’s services must 
be rendered to that company and to no other company, he was at liberty to become a 
director even if a rival company, and it not being established that he was making to 
the second company any disclosure of information obtained confidentially by him as 
a director of the company he could not at the instace of that company be restrained 
in his rival directorate.”324  
Each individual director is not as such an agent of the company and is, therefore, as a rule, 
free to transact business in his own account, even in competition with the company of which 
he is a director. Kanamugire argues that this rule may not be entirely correct since a director 
who becomes simultaneously a director for a rival company creates a situation which 
conflicts, or may possibly conflict, with his or her position.325 In Cook v Deeks, Lord 
Bushmaster held that: 
“men who assumes the complete control of a company’s business must remember 
that they are not at liberty to sacrifice the interests which they are bound to protect, 
and while ostensibly acting for the company, divert in their own favour business 
which should properly belong to the company they represent.”326  
According to the duty of trust occupied by a director, van Dijkhorst J said: “it is a duty to act 
for the benefit of the company and not for his own be efit.”327 It also follows that a director 
should not engage in activities that compete with his or her company. 
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2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed all common law fiduciary duties of a director of a company. These 
duties are the duty to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company; duty to act for 
the proper purpose; duty exercise independent judgment and the duty to avoid conflict of 
interests. These duties were derived from the 18th and 19th century English company law 
which was judicially created and developed through continuous interpretation and application 
in case law.328 The paramount fiduciary duty of directors is to exercise their powers bona fide 
in the best interests of the company.329 To ensure that the director does not breach this 
fundamental duty, the fiduciary relationship imposes a ring of prophylactic duties around 
him, which are all aimed at protecting the company to whom the duties are owed.330 
It must be stated that a director must exercise his or her powers in an independent and 
objective manner. He or she has a duty to do what he or she considers best serve the 
company’s interests. A director must further exercise his or her powers for the purpose for 
which they were given. Furthermore, a director must exercise judgment in an honest manner 
as to what is in the company’s interests and must act for the benefit of all shareholders and 
disclose on request to all shareholders and disclose on request to all shareholders, certain 
information connected with the company.331 A director must account to the company for 
profits made by reason of his or her directorship. This includes any gain or advantage made 
by a director while carrying out his or her duties as director. A director may not 
misappropriate or usurp a business opportunity which the company is pursuing or which the 
director is obliged to acquire for the company. Therefore, a director has a common law duty 
to disclose to the company any interest he or she has in a contract with the company. The rule 
at common law is that, unless the company’s article provide otherwise, a director may not, 
whether directly or indirectly, have an interest in a contract with the company, unless a 
general meeting of the company approves the contract, following full disclosure.332  
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Previously, director’s duties have been governed by the common law. The advent of the 2008 
Companies Act has partially codified the directors’ duties in terms of the statute. This chapter 
discusses all the common law fiduciary duties of directors that have been codified and 
incorporated in the Act.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The reform of company law in South Africa has brought about a number of important 
changes.   These changes include the partial codifiation of directors’ fiduciary duties. The 
changes have put measures in place to prevent the abus  of power by company directors. As 
one of the mechanisms, the Companies Act contains the general statement of the minimum 
duties of directors in a statutory form.333 There was a need to align South African company 
law to be in line with international trends and to reflect and accommodate the changing 
environment for businesses locally and internationally, whilst maintaining, encouraging and 
promoting compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided in the Constitution.334 In an attempt 
to create certainty, certain duties of directors have been partially codified in the Companies 
Act.335  
Codification does not entail a rigid fixation of law, but a proposed code with provisions that 
if used correctly by the courts, can ultimately lead to development of the law, based on the 
existing principles of South African common law.336 The aim of partial codification is not to 
revoke the common law but to ensure that the partial codification is appropriate to the legal, 
economic and social context of South Africa as a constitutional democracy and open 
economy.337 There are nine fundamental fiduciary duties which are acknowledged in 
Blackman338, where directors may not:  
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(i) exceed their power; or (ii) exercise their power for an improper or collateral 
purpose; or (iii) fetter their discretion; or (iv) place themselves in a position in 
which their personal interests conflict, or may possibly conflict, with their 
duties to the company, or (v) deal with the company otherwise than openly 
and in good faith; or (vi) make a secret profit; or (vii) take certain economic 
opportunities; or (viii) compete with the company; or (ix) misuse confidential 
information.’ 
 The relevant section of the 2008 Act in this regard is section 76 which reads as follows: 
“76. Standards of directors conduct- 
 A director of a company must- 
(a)  not use the position of director, or any information obtained while acting in the 
capacity of a director- 
(i) to gain an advantage for the director, or for another person other than the company or 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the company; or  
(ii) to knowingly cause harm to the company or a subsidiary of company; and  
(b) communicate to the board at the earliest practic ble opportunity any information that 
comes to the directors’ attention, unless the directo - 
(i) reasonably believes that the information is- 
(aa) immaterial to the company; or  
(bb) generally available to the public, or known to o her directors; or 
(ii) is bound not to disclose that information by a legal or ethical obligation of confidentiality. 
 
(2) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director- 
(a) In good faith and for a proper purpose; 




3.2 Statutory duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company 
The fundamental duty of good faith is now imposed by both the common law as well as the 
Act. It is a well-established rule of common law that directors have a fiduciary duty to 
exercise their powers in good faith and in the bestinterests of the company.339 The duty of 
good faith entails the duty to exercise an independent judgment and the duty to act within the 
limits or authority.340 The test of good faith is subjective and not objectiv , since the question 
is whether the director honestly believed that he or she acted in the interests of the 
company.341 The issue is about the director’s state of mind.342 The directors’ fiduciary duty to 
act in good faith and in the company’s best interest is partially codified in section 76 (3) (a) 
and (b) of the 2008 Companies Act which states that subject to s 76(4) and (5), a director of a 
company, when acting in that capacity, must exercis the powers and perform the functions 
of a director: 
• in good faith and for a proper purpose; and  
• in the best interests of the company. 
Section 76(3) (b) also gives a statutory basis for the common law duty to act in the best 
interest of the company. This section obligates a director, when acting in that capacity, to 
exercise his powers and perform his functions in the best interest of the company. In Visser 
Sitrus343, the court stated that the duty imposed by section 76(3) (b) to act in the best interest 
of the company is subjective.344 It requires the directors, having taken reasonably diligent 
steps to become informed, to have subjectively believ d that their decision was in the best 
interest of the company and that this belief must have had a rational basis. According to 
Rogers J, the test is not an objective one and does n t entitle the court, if the board’s decision 
is challenged, to determine what is objectively speaking in the best interests of the company. 
The Act does not provide details regarding these duties other than to state that directors of 
companies are expected to exercise their powers and to perform their powers in good faith 
and in the best interest of the company. However, th  Act does not explain what is meant by 
good faith. The significant of the above-mentioned omissions is that they leave scope for the 
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application of common law. In other words, common law remains relevant for purposes of 
determining the meaning and scope of the duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of 
the company. This is further stated in the DTI guidelines that the motive behind the 
enactment of the Act was not to unreasonably jettison the body of jurisprudence built up over 
more than a century.345 It is not the intention of the Act to replace the common-law duties of 
directors, to the extent that they are not in conflict with the standards of directors conduct 
provision.346 Accordingly the common law principles relating to the directors’ duties are still 
relevant to determine the content of the duties to the extent that they are not in conflict with 
the provision.347 
A further crucial implication of the principle that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the 
company is that, since the duties are owed to the company only, the company alone is entitled 
to enforce these duties against any delinquent directo s.348 The Act endorses the common law 
principle that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company i.e. the collective body of 
shareholders, whether present or future shareholders, not individual shareholders;349 or 
creditors of the company while the company is a goin  concern.350 Hence the importance of 
the new derivative action instituted in terms of s 165 on behalf of the company by a 
shareholder, a director of the company, or any other person with locus standi.351 This means 
where the company incurs a loss or damages as a result of a director’s breach of fiduciary 
duty, only the company may sue in respect of that loss.352 A shareholder cannot claim from 
the delinquent director for a loss he or she may have incurred as a result of a fall in the value 
of his or her shares caused by the director’s breach of fiduciary duty.353  
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Furthermore, section 76(2) has modified the common-law principle that directors of a 
subsidiary company did not owe any fiduciary duty to the holding company of the subsidiary, 
or to the group of companies of which the subsidiary fo med part. 354 
An innovation of the Companies Act is to qualify the duty by the introduction of a “business 
judgment rule” in section 76(4) which serves as a defense or ‘safe harbor’355 for directors 
against an alleged breach of the fiduciary duty. This rule requires the courts to defer to the 
directors’ judgment on what is in the ‘best interests of the company’ if their judgment was 
shown to be honest and reasonable.356 In addition to the business judgment rule, section 77(9) 
of the Companies Act provides that a court: ‘may reliev  the director, either wholly or partly, 
from any liability set out in this section, on any terms the court considers just if it appears to 
the courts that- 
(a) the director is or may be liable, but has acted honestly and reasonably; or 
(b) having regards to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the 
appointment of the director, it would be fair to excuse the director.’ 
 
3.3 Statutory duty to act for a proper purpose 
It is not enough for the directors to exercise their powers in good faith and in the best 
interests of the company. Section 76(3) requires that the directors must exercise their powers 
for the proper purpose.357 The Act does not define proper purpose but at commn-law it has 
always been taken to mean that directors must exercise their powers for the objective purpose 
for which the power was given to them and not for a collateral or ulterior purpose.358 It 
should be borne in mind that s 76(3) (a refer to two duties being the good faith and prope  
purpose but these are separate and distinct, and cumulative with the consequence that even if 
the directors have subjectively acted honestly in the interests of the company, they could be 
objectively in breach of their duty to exercise their powers for proper purpose.359  
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This section is a declaratory of the common law and effects no change in this aspect of the 
common-law fiduciary duties of directors.360 Cassim argues that section 76(3) (a) removes 
any doubt relating to the existence of the fiduciary duty to act for a proper purpose as some 
authorities do regard it as an aspect of the directo s’ duty of good faith.361 Some 
commentators have seen and considered this duty as an pect of the duty to act in good 
faith.362 Therefore the director’s duty to exercise powers fo  a proper purpose is now both a 
statutory and a common law obligation. It is an abuse of power for directors to exercise their 
powers for a purpose other than the purpose for which t e power was conferred on them. 
Unlike the duty of good faith, which is subjective, the test for proper purpose is objective.363 
It must be mentioned that section 38(1) of the Act confers on the board of directors the power 
to issue shares. This fiduciary power must be exercis d bona fide for a proper purpose and 
not for collateral purpose.364 Therefore, where the directors’ exercise of their powers is 
improper and is consequently set aside, the directors will be jointly and severally liable to 
compensate the company for any loss suffered in consequence of the improper exercise of the 
power.365 In Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (In liquidation) v Maxwell (No 2)366 
where a director of a company had used the company e sion funds to fund his own lifestyle. 
Hoffmann LJ held that the director was liable for the value of the shares, not even on the 
basis of any negligence, but merely by misapplying the assets.367 
Section 77(2) (a) of the Act also provides that a director will be h ld liable in accordance 
with the principles of the common law relating to a breach of a fiduciary duty, for any loss, 
damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of any breach by the director of 
a duty contemplated in section 76(3) (a or (b) (i.e. the duty to act in good faith and for a 
proper purpose).368 Where a director exceeds the power conferred on him his actions can only 
be validated through ratification by shareholders.369 
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It is an abuse of power for directors to exercise their powers for a purpose other than the 
purpose for which the power was conferred on them. The court in Darvall v North Sydney 
Brick & Tile Co Ltd370 held that the existence of subjective good faith is insufficient to save 
the purported exercise of a power, if the power wasexercised for a collateral purpose. Unlike 
the duty of good faith, which is subjective, the test for proper purpose is objective.371 In 
Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd372, the court tested section 76(3)(a) 
where the court had to determine inter alia whether t  board of directors had exercised the 
power to refuse to register a transfer of shares for a proper purpose and in good faith.373 With 
regards to proper purpose, Rogers J had the following to say: 
“as to proper purpose (s 76(3) (a), the test is objective, in the sense that, once one 
has ascertained the actual purpose for which the power was exercised, one must 
determine whether the actual purpose falls within te purpose for which the power 
was conferred, the latter being a matter of interprtation of the empowering 
provision in the context of the instrument as a whole. In the context of decisions by 
directors, there will often be, in my view, a close relationship between the 
requirements that the power should be exercised for a proper purpose and the 
requirement that the directors should act in what they consider to be the best 
interests of company. Put differently, the overarching purpose for which directors 
must exercise their powers is the purpose of promoting the best interests of the 
company.374 
 
3.4 Statutory duty to exercise an independent judgment 
The duty to exercise an independent judgment is seen by some commentators as an aspect of 
the directors’ duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company. This perhaps explains why 
this specific common-law duty is not explicitly referred to in section 76, and more 
specifically, in section 7 (2) and (3). On this basis, the duty to exercise an independent 
judgment continues to form part of the fiduciary and statutory duties of directors. 
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3.5 Statutory duty to act within their powers 
This fiduciary duty is not explicitly referred to in section 76 of the Act as a separate and 
distinct duty.375 Nevertheless it is an aspect of the fiduciary and statutory duty of directors to 
exercise their powers in good faith for a proper purpose, and in the best interests of the 
company, as provided in section 76(3) (a) and (b).376 Where a director disregards a 
constitutional limitation on his or her authority, a number of relevant statutory provisions 
may be triggered. Section 77(2) (a 377 imposes liability on a director in accordance with the 
principles of the common law relating to breach of fiduciary duty for any loss, damages or 
costs sustained by the company as a result of a breach of duty. It follows that, if directors 
disregard a constitutional limitation on their authority to act on behalf of the company, they 
may incur liability to the company for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company 
as a result of their failure to act within the constitutional limits of their authority. A director 
may also be held liable in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to delict 
for any loss, damages or costs sustained by a company as a consequence of any breach by a 
director of (among other things) any provision of the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation.378 
Furthermore, section 77(3) (a) imposes liability on a director for any loss, damages or costs 
sustained by a company as a direct or indirect consequence of the director having done some 
act in the name of the company, signed anything on behalf of the company, or purported to 
bind the company or authorize the taking of any action by or on behalf of the company 
despite knowing that he or she lack the authority to do so.379 
Section 20(6) of the Act, also confers a right to each shareholder of the company to claim 
damages against any incumbent or previous director wh  “fraudulently or due to gross 
negligence causes the company to do anything inconsiste t with a limit, restriction or 
qualification unless the fraudulent act or gross neglig nce has been ratified by a special 
resolution of the shareholders of the company.”380 R v Byrnes381, is an Australian decision 
where directors entered into an unauthorized transaction, when they ought to have known that 
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they were not authorized to enter into the transaction. Following this decision, it is the 
‘intent’ or ‘purpose’ of the director to gain an adv ntage or cause detriment to the company 
that is important. Cassim submits that based on this persuasive authority, there is a strong 
possibility of the court finding that the director has contravened the statutory duties under 
section 76(3)(a) or (b) of the Act, if the a director has knowingly entered into an unauthorized 
transaction on behalf of the company.382  
 
3.6 Statutory duty to avoid conflict of interest 
The duty to avoid conflict of interest is one of the most fundamental fiduciary duties at 
common law. Cassim describes this duty as “the core duty of a fiduciary”.383 A director may 
not place himself in a position in which he has, or can have, a personal interest or a duty to 
another, conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with his duties to the company.384 This 
duty is based on the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is a danger, in 
such circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather 
than duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he is bound to protect.385 For this reason, the 
courts have created an inflexible rule. This duty is specifically provided for in the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 which proposes to enhance corporate accountability and to ensure that 
directors are aware of their duties and responsibilities by partially codifying director’s 
duties386 and specifically setting a standard of directors’ conduct.387 In terms of the Act, 
directors must exercise the powers and perform the function of a director honestly and in 
good faith (bona fide) and for a proper purpose.388 Traditionally, the law has divided conflicts 
of duty and interest into two categories, namely the corporate opportunity rule and the no-
profit rule.389 
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3.6.1 The no-profit rule: section 76(2) (a) 
A director of a company must not use his position of a director, or any information obtained 
while acting in the capacity of a director, to gain n advantage for the director, or for another 
person other than the company; knowingly to cause harm to the company or a subsidiary of 
the company.390 In terms of section 1 of the Act the word “knowingly”, as used in section 
76(2)(a), means that the person either had actual knowledge of the matter or was in a position 
in which the person reasonably ought to have had actual knowledge or reasonably ought to 
have investigated the matter to an extent that would have provided the person with actual 
knowledge or reasonably ought to have taken other measures which, if taken, would 
reasonably be expected to have provided the person with actual knowledge of the matter.391 
The main idea behind the provisions is to limit directors’ power to enter into contracts with 
companies where conflicts of interests may arise as well as to enhance transparency and 
independence. The possible danger is that the director may be driven by the desire to give 
business to companies where they will also benefit at the expense of the company they are 
working for. As an enforcement measure, the Act provides for liability of directors where 
they have acted outside the authority vested in them and when their actions were contrary to 
the provisions of the Act.392 
Directors (and prescribed officers) are likely to contravene section 76(2) (a) (i) even if they 
have no intention of acting dishonestly. It is incosistent with the proper discharge of the 
duties of a director for directors to use their positi ns as directors or use corporate 
information to gain a personal advantage for themselve . It is also irrelevant that the company 
has suffered no loss or that it was not deprived of any opportunity that it might have used for 
its own advantage. 
It must be mentioned that the inclusion of a subsidiary represents a fundamental extension of 
the common-law principle. At common-law, a director of a holding company does not owe 
any fiduciary duty to its subsidiary. Each company in a group of companies is as a general 
rule regarded as a separate legal entity with its own rights and liabilities,393 unless the court 
decides to pierce the veil of corporate personality or this is done by the legislature. Section 
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76(2)(a) (ii) alleviates the severity of the common-law principle by imposing a duty on 
directors not to misuse their positions as directors or not to use information obtained as 
directors to knowingly cause harm to a subsidiary of the company.  
While section 76(2) (a) may have encapsulated the common-law no-profit rule, it is 
submitted that section 76 (2) (a) (i) and (ii) is wide enough to apply to both the no-profit rule 
and the corporate opportunity rule.394 Havenga disagrees with this proposition, he argued that 
the provision covers corporate situations only partially.395 She argues that neither of the 
limitation contained in section 76(2) (a) applies to the appropriation of corporate 
opportunities under the common law rule, and also that the section does not provide for the 
situation where a former director takes up an opportunity after his resignation from office.396 
For section 76(2) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Act to apply, the following requirements must be 
satisfied:397 
• the defendant must be a director, prescribed officer, or an alternate or de facto director 
or a member of a board committee or of the audit committee; 
• the information or advantage obtained (if any) must have come to the director while 
acting in his or her capacity as such or by reason of his or her position in the company 
as director; 
• the director must have used his or her position as director or information obtained in 
his or her capacity as a director either to gain an advantage or to knowingly cause 
harm to the company or its subsidiary; 
• such advantage (where applicable) must have been obtained for the director or for 
some other person (other than the company or its wholly owned subsidiary).398 
 
The court in Volvo v Yssel399 held that moneys that are earned secretly in breach of a duty 
of trust fall to be disgorged by the fiduciary and there is little room for him or her to avoid 
                                                          
394 Cassim (see note 3; 551). 
395 M Havenga ‘Directors exploitation of corporate opportunities and the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 2013 (2) 
TSAR 257-268 at 265. 
396 Havenga (see note 394; 266). 
397 Chew v R (1992) 173 CLR 626. 
398 Chev v R supra; para 89. 
399 2009 para 14. 
56 
 
that consequence. The court quoted with approval the dictum in Phillips v Fieldstone 
Africa (Pty) Ltd400 that:  
‘the rule is a strict one which allows little room for exceptions. It extends not only to 
actual conflicts of interest but also to those which are a real sensible possibility. The 
defences open to a fiduciary who breaches his trustare very limited: only the free 
consent of the principal after full disclosure will suffice in that a fiduciary who 
acquires for himself is deemed to have acquired for the trust and once proof of a 
breach of a fiduciary duty is adduced it is of no relevance that (1) the trust has 
suffered no loss or damage; (2) the trust could not itself have made use of the 
information, opportunity etc. or probably would not have done so; (3) the trust, 
although it could have used the information, opportunity has refused it or would do; 
(4) there is not privity between the principal and the party with whom the agent or 
servant is employed to contract business and the money would not have gone into 
the principal’s hands in the first instance; (5) it was no part of fiduciary’s duty to 
obtain the benefit for the trust; (6) the fiduciary acted honestly and reasonably.401 
 
3.6.2 The duty to communicate information to the company: section 76(2) (b) 
A director of the company must communicate to the board, at the earliest practicable 
opportunity, any information that comes to the director’s attention; unless the director 
reasonably believes that the information is immateri l to the company; or generally available 
to the public; or known to the directors; or is bound not to disclose that information by a legal 
or ethical obligation of confidentiality.402 Cassim argues that section 76(2) (b) is an omnibus 
provision that requires directors to convey material corporate information to the company.403 
Even though the section requires ‘any’ information t  be communicated to the company, this 
is sensibly pruned down by requiring the information: 
• to be material to the company; or  
• not to be generally available to the public; or 
• not to be already known to the directors; or  
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• not to be information that is protect from disclose by a legal or ethical duty.404 
Section 76(2) (b) attempts in effect to impose an ethical standard on irectors. Its raison 
d’être is simply that information is the property of the company,405 and that, as custodians of 
corporate information; directors may not misuse it for their own purposes. This is the correct 
approach, because corporate information is nowadays regarded as one of the company’s most 
valuable commodities. Section 76(2)(b) also encompasses the common-law ‘fair-dealing’ 
rule406 - a director must disclose, unasked, any information he or she has acquired when 
acting for the company that is likely to influence th  company’s decisions and which he or 
she knows that those acting on behalf of the company do not already possess.407  
Kanamugire argues that this section codifies the duty not to misuse confidential information 
that rightfully belongs to the company obtained while a person occupies the position of a 
director.408 It also codifies the duty not to compete with the company, as well as the duty not 
to take corporate opportunities.409 The underlying principle of section 76(2)(a) is the 
director’s duty of loyalty and fidelity and the duty of directors not to misuse confidential 
information that rightfully belongs to the company obtained while a person occupies the 
position of a director.410  
A director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform 
the functions of director in the best interests of the company.411 This obligation will be 
satisfied, in respect of any particular matter arising in the exercise of the powers or the 
performance of the functions of director, if – the director has taken reasonably diligent steps 
to become informed about the matter; either – the director had no material personal financial 
interest in the subject matter of the decision, and ha  no reasonable basis to know  that any 
related person had a personal financial interest in the matter; or the director complied with the 
requirements of section 75 with respect to any interest.412 This section codifies the director’s 
duty not to take corporate opportunities. 
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It has been established in Volvo v Yssel413 that moneys that are earned secretly in breach of a 
duty of trust fall to be disgorged by the fiduciary nd there is little room for him or her to 
avoid that consequence. In Kukama v Lobelo and Others414 is a precedent setting case in 
which the first order of delinquency against a director was made in terms of section 162 
(5)(c) of the Act.415 In 2010 and 2011 the South African Revenue Service (SARS) made two 
refunds of approximately R 22 million and R 39 million into the bank account of Diphuka.416 
The amount of R 22 million was a rebate due by SARS to Peolwane but SARS in error paid 
this amount into the bank account of Diphuka.417 It transpired that the payment of R 39 
million was not due by SARS at all, to either Peolwane or Diphuka. The payment of R 22 
million had not been transferred to Peolwane’s bank account as it should have been and 
Lobelo had instead used it for the benefit of other companies that were not subsidiaries of 
Peolwane.418 The court held that the conduct of Lobelo in dealings with the affairs of 
Peolwane did not measure up to the standard required and expected of a director.419 Further 
that Lobelo was in breach of s 76(2) (b of the Act by failing to communicate to Kukama (as 
a co-director and co-shareholder of Peolwane) the information relating to the payments by 
SARS into the bank account of Diphuma.420 Therefore, the duty to communicate relevant 
information to the board of directors is an integral p rt of the directors’ fiduciary duties of 
loyalty, good faith and the avoidance of a conflict of interest.421 Section 76(2) (b) also 
complements s 76(2) (a) (i) and (ii). The latter prohibits the use of corp ate information to 
gain an advantage or to inflict harm on the company. Then section 76(2) (b) completes this 
prohibition by positively requiring a director to cmmunicate information to his or her 
company. 
 
3.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have discussed the statutory duties of directors of a company in terms of the 
Companies Act of 2008. The directors’ fiduciary duties are partially codified in the standards 
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of directors conduct provision.422The companies Act 2008 has codified and modified almost 
all the traditional director’s common law duties. The partial codification of the director’s 
duties is one of the important changes brought by the new company law regime. Codification 
of the director’s duties makes the law easily accessible. Studies undertaken by different 
organizations have shown that many directors do not k w what their duties are. This makes 
it essential for the duties to be codified and encourages good corporate governance.423 
Codification also affords South Africa an opportuniy to conform to international best 
practices.424 
The duties of directors are contained in section 76 of the 2008 Companies Act.425 This section 
deals specifically with the duty to act in good faith and for a proper purpose, the duty to act in 
the best interest of the company, and the duty of care, skill and diligence. Even though the 
Act has largely retained common law principle, it has also brought important changes that 
worth mentioning in relation to the fiduciary duties. The duties of a director are no longer 
limited to the company that the director serves, but now extend to wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of that company. The partial codification of the duties of directors will assist companies, in 
particular their directors, to be more compliant.426 The fact that the codification is partial 
means that not all common law principles have been incorporated into the Act. Hence, the 
common law shall continue to apply in this area of law. This was explained by the DTI report 
that the motive behind enactment of the Act was not to unreasonably jettison the body of 
jurisprudence built up over more than a century.427 Section 77 also codified common law 
remedies as its states that where a director has breached his fiduciary duty to act in good faith 
and for a proper purpose, or the duty to act in the best interest of the company, he shall be 
held liable in accordance with the principles of common law relating to a breach of duties, for 
any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company.428   
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
4.1 Introduction 
The fiduciary duties of directors are of fundamental importance to any developed corporate 
law system. This is largely due to the fact that as a separate legal entity or juristic person 
which exists apart from its management and sharehold rs, a company must necessarily act 
through individuals.429 The functions and responsibilities of corporate dir ctors, who are 
entrusted with its management, arise by virtue of this nature of a company.430 Company 
management can only be effective if those who manage are allowed a certain measure of 
freedom and discretion in the exercise of their function.431 Contrarily, effective control of 
management is vital in the interests of the company itself and its various stakeholders.432  
Company directors are subject to various duties. Their onerous common law fiduciary 
responsibilities exist in addition to the various statutory duties contained in the Companies 
Act. A company directorship is generally regarded as one of the most complex fiduciary 
offices.433 The fiduciary relationship arises from the purpose for which the director’s office 
and powers are entrusted to her, namely the benefit of the company.434 Therefore it is 
significant that directors know and understand their duties in order that they do not breach 
their duties negligently or abuse their discretionary powers.435 
It must be submitted that there is an extensive literature on the fiduciary duties of directors 
but the duties of a company director represent a subject that is not merely academic in nature, 
but one that is of vital importance in our ever changing commercial world. More and more 
people are appointed as company directors every day and often they do not know or 
understand the implications of what they have agreed to. This problem is further exacerbated 
by partial codification of the directors’ duties because the fiduciary are now derived from 
both the common law and the statute.  
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The duties of directors have been a contentious isse in company law jurisprudence. These 
duties play a role in ensuring the promotion of corporate governance principles.436 The 
common-law fiduciary duties of directors require thm to exercise their powers bona fide and 
for the benefit of the company.437 In addition, they have the duty to display reasonable care 
and skill in carrying out their functions: they should act in the best interests of the company, 
avoid conflicts, not take corporate opportunities or ecret profits, not fetter their votes, and 
use their powers for the purpose conferred and not for a collateral purpose.438 
The Companies Act contains provisions dealing with d rectors’ general duties that are 
comparable to the common-law duties of directors: the Companies Acts provisions pertaining 
to the duties of directors are a semi- or quasi-codfication of their common law duties. Katz is 
of the view that this codification does not in reality alter the common-law position, it is 
merely descriptive of the common law. 
At common law it is clear that directors owe fiduciary duties to the company of which he is a 
director. In the parent-subsidiary context the common law principle is that the subsidiary 
company owes no duty to the holding company,439 and the holding company owes no duty to 
the subsidiary except in specific circumstances where control is exercised.  
 
4.2 Findings of the study 
Chapter one (1) of this study explored the definitio  of a director in regards to both the 
common law and the Act, and also considered the meaning of the fiduciary in the context of 
the company law. It was discovered that the definitio  of the term ‘director’ is broad enough 
to accommodate other persons to be associated with the position of a director.440 For instance, 
the words ‘occupying the position of a director’ in the definition of a director makes it clear 
that a de facto director constitutes a director for the purposes of the Act.441 There is no 
distinction drawn between executive, non-executive and independent directors however an 
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important distinction is made between these types of directors in practice.442 It was revealed 
that a director of a company owes a fiduciary duty to the company from the day he accepts 
the position of a director.443 A director of a company owes a fiduciary duty to the company 
and only the company alone and does not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders even if 
appointed by them.444 Furthermore, directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to the company’s 
creditors except where the company is insolvent or early insolvent.445 Thus, a director of a 
company has a duty of trust relationship with the company, and he or she should not breach 
his contractual duty held in trust. 
Chapter two discussed all the common law fiduciary duties of director of a company. These 
are the duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company, duty to act for a 
proper purpose, duty to exercise an independent business judgment and the duty to avoid 
conflict of interest. The duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company is 
described as the duty of absolute loyalty or honest446 and utmost good faith to the 
company.447 This is a subjective duty as the courts will not interfere with a director’s 
decision, where the director honestly believed thate decision he or she took was for the 
benefit of the company as a whole.448 It was discovered that the court will only set aside a 
decision taken by the board if it is clear that there is presence of mala fides, by virtue of the 
fact that the directors did not act in good faith and in the best interests of the company when 
making a decision.449 It is apparent that the fiduciary duty that a director of a company must 
exercise the powers and perform the function of director in good faith and best interests of the 
company. The director owes the duty to the company itself not to individual shareholders or 
other stakeholders.450  
Furthermore, when analyzing the duty to act for the proper purpose, it was revealed that it is 
an abuse of power for directors to exercise their powers for a purpose other than the purpose 
for which the power was conferred on them. The duty to act for proper purposes is important 
because it is a flexible and useful tool which enables the court to review the directors’ 
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decision.451 At common law proper purpose is defined as meaning that the powers given to 
directors must be exercised for the purpose for which they were granted. Many of the cases 
which dealt with this duty under common law concerned the power of directors to issue new 
shares of the company. Such power must not be used for an ulterior motive such as 
entrenching control of the company or thwarting bona fide takeover offers. The courts are not 
entrusted with this decision. On the other hand, it is the sphere of the courts to determine 
what actions are not in the beneficiaries’ interest, and an action will not be in the 
beneficiaries’ interest if it constitutes a breach of any of the specific duties.452 Directors are 
not entitled to use their powers of issuing shares m rely for the purpose of maintaining their 
control or control of themselves and their friends over the affairs of the company, or merely 
for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority of shareholders.453 
Furthermore, directors are entitled to consider the reputation, experience and policies of 
anyone seeking to take over the company. It they decide, on reasonable grounds, that a 
takeover will cause substantial damage to the company’s interests they are entitled to use 
their powers to protect the company.454 
It was also revealed that directors must as a general rule not fetter their discretion. This 
means they should not enter into an agreement with a third part as how they exercise their 
discretion. Directors have the job of managing the company and they are given certain 
powers to enable them to do that. But they must act ac ording to the company’s constitution 
and use those powers in the interests of the company, not to further their narrow interests. For 
example, their power to issue new shares must be used for the purpose of raising capital for 
the business. Issuing shares to your cronies just to keep voting control in friendly hands is an 
abuse of power and a breach of duty. 
A director must not use the position of director, or any information obtained as a director, to 
gain personal advantage or for personal gain, nor advantage for any other person, other that 
the company itself.455  
 
                                                          
451 Lee (see note 184; 79-97). 
452 P Finn Fiduciary Obligations (1977) 16. 
453 Piercy v Mills & Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ch. 77. 
454 Hogg v Cramphorn supra; 317. 
455 Kanamugire (see note 324; 80). 
64 
 
In Cyberscene Ltd and Others v i-Kiosk Internet and Information (Pty) Ltd456, the court held 
that clearly a director acts in breach of his fiducary duty to the company where he sabotages 
the company’s contractual opportunities for his own advantage, or where he uses confidential 
information to advance the interests of a rival concer  or his own business to the prejudice of 
those of his company. 
Furthermore, directors are not allowed to take corporate opportunities. A man who stands in a 
position of trust towards another, cannot, in matters affected by that position advance his or 
her own interests (e.g. by making a profit) at thatother’s expense.457 We discovered that a 
director cannot acquire a property that constitutes a corporate opportunity and re-sell it to the 
company at a profit. The law does not give effect to his or her intention; it treats the 
acquisition as one made in the interests of the company.458 
Chapter 3 discusses the statutory fiduciary duties of directors of the company. We have 
shown that the directors’ fiduciary duties are partially codified in the standards of directors’ 
conduct provision.459 However, it is not the intention of the Act to replace the common-law 
duties of directors, to the extent that they are not i  conflict with the standards of directors’ 
conduct provision.460We have shown that partial codification of the director’s duties 
improves the clarity, simplicity and legal certainty, and thus makes the law more accessible to 
directors and other people affected by the actions of directors. What is further evident from 
the Act is that it extends liability for breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill 
to not only directors, but also to prescribed officers and to committees of the board members, 
irrespective of the fact that they are not appointed as directors. Prescribed officer can be 
defined as any person who exercises general executiv  control over the management or 
business of a company, or who regularly participates to material degree in the exercise of 
general executive control. In the light of the aforementioned a shadow director will most 
probably also be included in the definition of a prescribed officer. 
Section 73(3) expressly states that a director, when acting on behalf of the company, should 
perform all of his or her functions and powers in good faith, for a proper purpose, in the best 
interests of the company, and with the requisite degre  of care, skill and diligence that may 
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reasonably be expected of a person holding such office, with the same level of knowledge 
and skill as that director. Furthermore, section 76 (2) places a positive obligation on a director 
to avoid any conflict of interests with the company.461 Section 72 (2) (a) may be viewed as a 
restatement of the common law no profit rule. One material difference is the extension of the 
fiduciary duty to subsidiaries of the holding company. Directors’ fiduciary duties did not 
extend to subsidiary companies under common law. Section 77 of the Act makes provision 
for the liability of a director in the event that he/she breaches one or more of his statutory 
duties owed towards the company.462 
 
4.3 Contributions of the study 
This study sought to assist in the interpretation of fiduciary duties since the partial 
codification in order to apprehend the 2008 Act andoutline the current position in relation 
between the 2008 Act and the common law. Most importantly, the common law principles 
are reserved to function in tandem with the partial st tutory codification.463 This allows 
directors to reach for answers in the treasure chests of the common law if the statutes cannot 
provide them with guidance or an answer in a set of complicated factual circumstances that 
requires a decision based on the application of the principles of fiduciary duties. In addition, 
the tried and tested common law principles will notbe abandoned forever. 
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